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MARYLAND FORECLOSURE MEDIATION - WORKING OR 
WANING? A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE STATE’S 
FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM 
 
Chelsea Jones* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In mid-January 2012, members of the Maryland Home Preser-
vation Task Force testified before a state House committee with a 
number of recommendations aimed at solving Maryland’s foreclosure 
crisis.
1
 The foreclosure problem is particularly acute in Prince 
George’s County, Maryland, a predominately African American coun-
ty neighboring Washington, DC. Thirty-one percent of the state’s fore-
closure events are located within the county.
2
 In the quarter from Janu-
ary to September 2011, there were 22,401 Notices of Intent to 
Foreclose (“NOIs”) in Prince George’s County.3 Elsewhere in the 
state, Baltimore City and Baltimore County were in second and third 
place, respectively, with nearly 12,000 NOIs each.
4
 Across the United 
States, foreclosure numbers continue to fluctuate. In September of the 
third quarter of 2012, national foreclosure filings, default notices, 
scheduled auctions, and bank repossessions of properties were at their 
lowest rate since 2007. 
5
 In states such as New York and New Jersey, 
however, third quarter foreclosure activity increased substantially.
6
 
                                                          
*
J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of 
Law. I would like to thank the staff of the Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and 
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1
 Jamie Smith Hopkins, Suggestions to Stave off Foreclosures, BALT. SUN, 
Jan. 19, 2012, at A14.  
2
 Anika Anand, Affluent Black County Mired in Mortgage Mess, 
NBCNEWS.COM (June 14, 2011, 10:50 AM), http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/43343 
008/ns/mortgage_mess/#.Trm-KlYVLds; MD. DEP’T OF HOUS. & CMTY. DEV., 
PROPERTY FORECLOSURES IN MARYLAND THIRD QUARTER 2012 3 (2012), available 
at http://mdhope.dhcd.maryland.gov/pages/MoreNews.aspx.  
3
 MD. FORECLOSURE TASK FORCE, MARYLAND FORECLOSURE TASK FORCE 
REPORT 18 (2012). 
4
 Id. 
5
 Press Release, Foreclosure Activity Drops to 5-Year Low in September, 
RealtyTrac (Oct. 9, 2012), available at  
http://www.realtytrac.com/content/foreclosure-market-report/september-and-q3-
2012-us-foreclosure-market-report-7424.  
6
 Id. Both New York and New Jersey are judicial foreclosure states. See infra 
Part III (discussing the different types of foreclosure processes). 
Jones 2/13/2013  3:59 PM 
2012] MARYLAND FORECLOSURE MEDIATION 397 
These variations represent the lingering effects of the burst of the 
housing bubble.
7
  
It is now widely understood that the collapse of the subprime 
market in 2007 was the catalyst in an economic avalanche that this 
country is still trying to claw its way through.
8
 The surge in subprime 
loans was evident in Maryland where, “[B]etween the first quarter of 
2003 and the second quarter of 2007, the share of Maryland’s sub-
prime loans as a percentage of all mortgage loans in service grew from 
a low of 2.6 percent to a historic high of 12.8 percent.”9 The United 
States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Af-
fairs issued a recent report titled, “Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: 
Anatomy of a Financial Collapse,” which pointed to high-risk loans as 
a major contributing factor of the “Great Recession.”10 The report 
identified a number of other key contributors to the economic crisis 
such as the failure of government oversight, inflated credit ratings for 
risky U.S. mortgage backed securities, and banks that created highly 
complex financial instruments that garnered billions of dollars.
11
 This 
“perfect storm” sent ripples through the housing market, and in the 
first quarter of 2007, subprime loans in Maryland accounted for more 
than half of all serious deficiencies.
12
  
States around the country tried to respond to the housing crisis 
by enacting legislation to slow its progress.
13
 Maryland’s effort came 
in the form of a foreclosure mediation bill, which took effect on July 1, 
2010.
14
 The bill allows homeowners to meet with their lenders and a 
neutral third-party--an administrative law judge--to avoid foreclo-
sure.
15
 Although many Marylanders facing foreclosure may be em-
                                                          
7
 Kathryn J. Byun, The U.S. Housing Bubble and Bust, MONTHLY LABOR 
REV., December 2012, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2010/12/art1full. 
pdf.  
8
 MD. FORECLOSURE TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 12. 
9
 Id. 
10
 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 
112TH CONG., WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL 
COLLAPSE (Comm. Print 2011). 
11
 Id. at 2–12.  
12
 MD. FORECLOSURE TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 12. 
13
 Foreclosure Mediation Programs by State, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 
http://www.nclc.org/issues/foreclosure-mediation-programs-by-state.html (last visit-
ed Jan. 9, 2013). 
14
 H.D. 472, 2010 Leg., 427th Sess. (Md. 2010). 
15
 Ovetta Wiggins, Maryland Bill Provides Foreclosure Mediation for Home-
owners, WASH. POST (April 15, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/04/14/AR2010041404602.html.  
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powered through legislation to take action, the available figures paint a 
less enthusiastic picture.
16
 In the program’s first year, only 317 cases 
out of roughly 33,000 active foreclosures were resolved in media-
tion.
17
 Maryland is not the only state that has seen low foreclosure me-
diation success rates. Florida’s rates were so low that the Florida Su-
preme Court decided to shutter its program altogether.
18
 Not all states, 
however, have encountered such a lackluster response. Philadelphia’s 
foreclosure mediation program
19
 has seen remarkable success rates. In 
the first year of the program, “[eighty-five] percent of borrowers who 
had reached agreements with their lenders . . . were still in their homes 
eighteen months later.” 20 With participation rates that vary state-to-
state, firm conclusions about the country’s collective response to fore-
closure mediation as a tool to slow foreclosures are hard to pin down.  
This Comment examines Maryland’s foreclosure mediation 
law and takes a comparative look at city and state mediation programs 
across the country. This Comment then analyzes the inherent flaws of 
mediation that disproportionately affect minority communities and 
suggests litigation as a better avenue to vindicate the rights of home-
owners who were the targets of predatory lending. Given that foreclo-
sure mediation is currently law in Maryland, this Comment suggests 
that a switch to an “opt-out” or “automatic mediation” program will 
capture more homeowners eligible for foreclosure mediation. Finally, 
this Comment examines a recent Maryland Court of Appeals case in-
volving whistleblower protection laws that might have broad applica-
tion to financial institutions and the effort to strengthen loss mitigation 
strategies.  
 
 
                                                          
16
 Due to the confidentiality surrounding foreclosure mediation many of the 
most recent participation figures are unreported.   
17
 Gary Haber, Few Marylanders Facing Foreclosure Seeking Mediation, 
BALT. BUS. J. (Jan. 18, 2011, 2:56 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/baltimore/news/ 
2011/01/18/few-marylanders-facing-foreclosure.html. 
18
 Kathleen Haughney, Florida Justice Shuts Down Foreclosure Mediation, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 20, 2011, at A10. 
19
 Philadelphia’s program is formally called the “Residential Mortgage Fore-
closure Diversion Program” and was instituted by the Court of Common Pleas. See 
Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Diversion Program, PHILA. CTS, 
http://www.courts.phila.gov/mfdp/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2013). 
20
 Al Heavens, On the House: Phila.’s Anti-Foreclosure Program a Success 
Story, PHILA. INQUIRER (July 3, 2011, 3:01 AM), 
http://www.philly.com/philly/columnists/al_heavens/20110703_On_the_House__Phi
la__s_anti-foreclosure_program_a_success_story.html.  
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I.  WHAT IS MEDIATION? 
 
Mediation is defined as “a method of nonbinding dispute reso-
lution involving a neutral third party who tries to help the disputing 
parties reach a mutually agreeable solution.”21 Mediation is often de-
scribed under the umbrella of “alternative dispute resolution,” other-
wise known as, “ADR.” A mediator’s role is important to the result 
that mediation produces. As a result, mediation can be directive, eval-
uative, facilitative, or relational/psychosocial.
22
 At a minimum, media-
tion is a vehicle for the parties subject to the mediation to engage in a 
constructive dialogue where one party states a position on an issue and 
the adverse party responds accordingly. The mediator “supervises the 
exchange of information and negotiations by helping the parties to re-
define their respective issues and positions and bargain realistically.”23 
Mediation proceedings are kept highly confidential. In fact, Rule 17-
109 of the Maryland Rules of Alternative Dispute Resolution states, 
“[A] mediator and any person present or otherwise participating in the 
mediation at the request of the mediator shall maintain the confidenti-
ality of all mediation communications and may not disclose or be 
compelled to disclose mediation communications in any judicial, ad-
ministrative, or other proceeding.”24 
Mediation has been touted as a superior alternative to litiga-
tion.
25
 Backlogged courts and the high costs of going to trial are often 
large incentives for parties to settle their disputes out of court.
26
 Medi-
ators may also candidly describe to parties the hurdles they might face 
if a case is brought to trial. A trial-lawyer turned professor gave this 
description of a mediation experience:, “[O]ur experienced mediator 
                                                          
21
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (8th ed. 2004). 
22
 Josefina M. Rendón, Under the Justice Radar?: Prejudice in Mediation and 
Settlement Negotiations, 30 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 347, 350 (2005) (stating that di-
rective occurs “where the neutral steers the parties towards his/her idea of what is 
appropriate for the parties;” 2) evaluative—“where the neutral assesses the parties' 
legal arguments and chances in court;” 3) facilitative—“where the mediator merely 
aids the parties in their negotiations without imposing his/her own ideas or evaluat-
ing the parties' case;” 4) relational or psychosocial—“focuses on the parties' relation-
ship rather than on achieving settlement”). Id. 
23
 Cynthia R. Mabry, African Americans “Are Not Carbon Copies” of White 
Americans – The Role of African American Culture in Mediation of Family Disputes, 
13 OHIO ST. L. ON DISP. RESOL. 405, 410 (1998).  
24
 MD. R. 17-109(a). 
25
 Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of 
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359–63 (1985).  
26
 Id. 
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gave both sides a serious reality check. In meticulous fashion, he iden-
tified evidentiary and other obstacles we would have to overcome at 
trial.”27 In the family law context, mediation disputes are resolved in 
far less time than litigation.
28
 Often, the time it takes to settle a dispute 
via mediation is between three and twenty-five hours, whereas “liti-
gants may wait six to twenty-four months just to get a trial date.”29 
The practice of mediation dates back to 1800 B.C. when the 
Mari Kingdom, in what is today known as Syria, resolved disputes 
with other kingdoms.
30
 In America, ADR’s early roots can be found in 
both social and government contexts. Local churches played mediator-
like roles, encouraging disputants to resolve conflict through a mutual 
agreement.
31
 The negotiating and coalition building at the Constitu-
tional Convention has also been recognized as an ADR triumph.
32
 
From early American History to present day, ADR, and mediation in 
particular, have grown in acceptance.
33
 A layperson might be most fa-
miliar with mediation in the family law context where it is often em-
ployed to settle family disputes,
34
 but recently, many states have 
adopted mediation as a tool in combating the foreclosure crisis. 
 
II. MARYLAND’S FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM 
 
Before Maryland’s foreclosure mediation bill was passed, 
Governor Martin O’Malley testified before the state legislature’s 
House Environmental Matters Committee.
35
 There, he touted the bene-
fits of the proposed bill.
36
 The Governor laid out four of its major 
components. First, it “requires servicers to provide critical information 
about timelines and tools available to borrowers that can save their 
                                                          
27
 Michael Goldsmith, Confessions of A Litigator: The Surprising Benefits of 
Mediation, UTAH B.J., May/June 2009, at 11. 
28
 Mabry, supra note 23, at 413. 
29
 Id. 
30
 JEROME T. BARRETT WITH JOSEPH P. BARRETT, A HISTORY OF 
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION xxv (2004). 
31
 Id. at 42–43. 
32
 Id. at 47–48. 
33
 Id. at 266–68. 
34
 Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of 
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1363–64 
(1985). 
35
 Governor Martin O’Malley, Speech before the Md. House Envtl. Matters 
Comm. (Feb. 16, 2010), available at http://www.governor.maryland.gov/speeches/ 
100216a.asp.  
36
 Id. 
Jones 2/13/2013  3:59 PM 
2012] MARYLAND FORECLOSURE MEDIATION 401 
homes.”37 Second, the bill prevents servicers from commencing a 
foreclosure action “until the servicer can file an affidavit that they 
have offered or tried to offer the borrower any . . . loan modification 
and loss mitigation options . . . available.”38 Third, borrowers “must 
have the right to mediation before a foreclosure sale can take place.”39 
Finally, servicers are required to pay a foreclosure-filing fee to “help 
fund housing counselors and defray judicial costs.”40  
Under Maryland’s law, when a lender sends the homeowner a 
Notice of Intent to Foreclose, it is also required to include a number of 
additional documents including a loss mitigation application for pro-
grams applicable to the loan.
41
 If a loss mitigation analysis has not yet 
been completed, the lender should include contact information for 
nonprofit and government foreclosure resources that are available to 
the homeowner.
42
 The lender is also required to include a preprinted 
envelope with the address of the attorney in charge of handling the 
foreclosure for the lender.
43
 From this point, homeowners have forty-
five days to respond before a foreclosure sale of the property may oc-
cur.
44
 If the lender ultimately files a complaint with the court to fore-
close, the lender must include, among other things, a final loss mitiga-
tion affidavit and a $300 dollar filing fee.
45
 Homeowners have only 
fifteen days after receiving the lender’s final loss mitigation affidavit 
to request foreclosure mediation affirmatively. A fifty-dollar 
waiveable filing fee must accompany the request.
46
 Once a request for 
foreclosure mediation has been filed, the property cannot go to sale un-
til at least fifteen days after the mediation has been held.
47
 It is im-
portant to note that the lender or servicer can move to strike the home-
owner’s request for foreclosure mediation within fifteen days of 
receiving the request.
48
  
After receiving the homeowner’s request for foreclosure medi-
ation, the court has five days to transmit the request to the Office of 
                                                          
37
 Id. 
38
 Id. 
39
 Id. 
40
 Id. 
41
 H.D. 472, 2010 Leg., 427th Sess. (Md. 2010). 
42
 Id.  
43
 Id. 
44
 Id. 
45
 Id. 
46
 Id. 
47
 Id. 
48
 Id.; MD. R.  CIV. P. CIR. CT. 2-322(e).  
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Administrative Hearings.
49
 Within sixty days after transmittal, the par-
ties must conduct a foreclosure mediation.
50
 The homeowner is re-
quired to be present at the meeting and may be accompanied by a law-
yer or housing counselor.
51
 The lender or a representative must also be 
present along with a neutral mediator.
52
 The parties have sixty days to 
reach an agreement, and if the time expires with no extension by the 
Office of Administrative Hearings, the foreclosure attorney may 
schedule the foreclosure sale.
53
 In October 2011, the Office of the 
Commissioner of Financial Regulation set forth new regulations. The-
se rules revised the notices provided to homeowners in risk of foreclo-
sure, making them clearer.
54
 In a sample Notice of Intent to Foreclose 
provided on the Maryland Department of Labor Licensing and Regula-
tion website, the language at the top of the document reads in large, 
underlined letters, “There may be options to avoid foreclosure, but you 
must act immediately.”55  
Although the notice clearly conveys the urgency of taking ac-
tion quickly, it does not and perhaps is not the best vehicle to convey 
to homeowners why mediation is worth their time and money.  In pre-
dominately minority communities, many lenders engaged in predatory 
lending and led unsuspecting homeowners down the path to foreclo-
sure.
56
 It is not inconceivable to imagine the questions a homeowner 
might have upon receiving a Notice of Intent to Foreclose. On whose 
terms will the mediation agreement rest? Where predatory lending ex-
ists, will a lawsuit better vindicate a homeowner’s rights? Is the neutral 
mediator really neutral? What exactly is mediation? To the state’s 
credit, included in the Notice of Intent to Foreclose must be contact in-
formation for free housing counseling services as well as the web ad-
dress for the state’s foreclosure resource.57 
 
 
                                                          
49
 H.D. 472, 2010 Leg., 427th Sess. (Md. 2010). 
50
 Id. 
51
 Id. 
52
 Id. 
53
 Id. 
54
 MD. CODE REGS. § 9.3.12 (2011). 
55
 MD. DEP’T OF LAB., LICENSING & REGULATION, APPENDIX A: NOTICE OF 
INTENT TO FORECLOSE 1 (2011), available at http://www.dllr.state.md.us/finance/ 
finregforms.shtml.  
56
 See Editorial, Fair Lending and Accountability, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2011, 
at A28. 
57
 Id. 
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III. MEDIATION PROGRAMS ACROSS THE COUNTRY – A COMPARATIVE 
LOOK 
 
As a result of the housing crisis, many cities and states have 
enacted foreclosure mediation laws or implemented foreclosure media-
tion proceedings.
58
 Though the goal, stemming the tide of foreclosures 
and keeping financially troubled homeowners in their homes, is com-
mon among many states with foreclosure mediation laws, the methods 
of implementation vary from state to state. The Center for American 
Progress, a left-leaning Washington-based think tank conducted a re-
view of state-based foreclosure mediation programs in June 2010 and 
noted the differences in mediation program structure. Some foreclo-
sure mediation programs are judicial in nature; thus, the lender initi-
ates a suit in court to foreclose on the property.
59
 Some states have 
non-judicial programs where the court system is not involved.
60
 Other 
states require homeowners to “opt-in” to the foreclosure mediation, 
meaning the homeowner must affirmatively request the mediation ser-
vice, whereas in other states, the process is automatic, requiring me-
diation whenever a foreclosure is initiated through a foreclosure sale or 
through the filing of a judicial foreclosure.
61
 Many of these automatic 
foreclosure programs occur in judicial foreclosure states and see much 
higher rates of participation than opt-in states. 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania’s Residential Mortgage Foreclosure 
Diversion Pilot Program is often characterized as the gold standard of 
mediation programs.
62
 Philadelphia’s program was initiated in April 
2008 and is mandatory.
63
 Before a foreclosure sale can proceed, the 
parties must participate in a conciliation conference.
64
 Philadelphia’s 
program provides homeowners with a hotline where they can speak di-
rectly with a housing counselor prior to meeting with the lender’s rep-
resentative during mediation. Philadelphia also does not automatically 
                                                          
58
 The principal difference between the two is that some programs are legisla-
tively created while others are judicially created. 
59
 ALON COHEN & ANDREW JAKABOVICS, NOW WE’RE TALKING: A LOOK AT 
CURRENT STATE-BASED FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS AND HOW TO BRING 
THEM TO SCALE 3 (2010). 
60
 Id.  
61
 Id.  
62
 Id. at 21; Peter S. Goodman, Philadelphia Gives Homeowners a Way to Stay 
Put, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2009 at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/18/ 
business/18philly.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
63
  Heavens, supra note 20. 
64
 HEATHER SCHEIWE KULP, FORECLOSURE MEDIATION AND MITIGATION 
PROGRAM MODELS 33 (2011). 
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assign the parties a mediator. Instead, the parties informally meet with 
a retired judge, a Judge Pro Temp. If the dispute cannot be resolved 
with a conciliation conference, the court stands at the ready to appoint 
a mediator to commence a private meeting. In December 2008, more 
than six months after the city’s mediation program was initiated, posi-
tive results were evident. Of the 2,331 homeowners who participated 
in a conciliation conference, 2,270 avoided foreclosure.
65
 Of that total, 
603 homeowners resolved with their lenders, 244 averted bankruptcy, 
and 1,423 postponed mediation to talk with a housing counselor.
66
 As 
of December 16, 2010, unofficial court reports indicate that 13,000 
conferences have taken place, resulting in borrowers maintaining 
2,500 and 3,000 homes outright.
67
 
Not all foreclosure mediation programs have been as successful 
as Philadelphia’s program. In December 2011, the Florida Supreme 
Court issued an order formally terminating its state-managed media-
tion foreclosure program.
68
 Before its program was shuttered, Florida, 
like Philadelphia, used the automatic foreclosure mediation method. 
This method virtually requires no additional homeowner action be-
cause the state schedules the first mediation session once the mortgage 
lender initiates foreclosure proceedings.
69
 Prior to a Florida Supreme 
Court order in 2009 aimed at developing a coordinated state response, 
Florida’s twenty judicial circuits constructed their own distinct ap-
proaches to the foreclosure crisis.
70
 Some counties, like that of Miami-
Dade, implemented mediation programs where the success rate was as 
high as seventy-four percent.
71
    
In an effort to streamline the success of Florida’s foreclosure 
mediation program, former Chief Justice of Florida’s highest court, 
Peggy Quince, adopted a model whereby, “[A]ll foreclosure cases in 
state courts that involve residential homestead property will be re-
ferred to mediation, unless the plaintiff and borrower agree otherwise 
or unless pre-suit mediation that substantially complies . . . with the 
managed mediation program requirements has been conducted.”72 Less 
                                                          
65
 Id. 
66
 Id. 
67
 Id. 
68
 In re Managed Mediation Program for Residential Mortgage Foreclosure 
Cases, No. AOSC11-44 (Fla. Dec. 19, 2011).  
69
 COHEN & JAKABOVICS, supra note 59, at 3, 5.  
70
 Sharon Press, Mortgages Foreclosure Mediation in Florida - Implementa-
tion Challenges for an Institutionalized Program, 11 NEV. L.J. 306, 308–14 (2011).  
71
 COHEN & JAKABOVICS, supra note 59, at 17.  
72
 Press, supra note 70, at 334.  
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than two years later, in 2011, an order from the current Chief Justice of 
the Florida Supreme Court, Charles Canady, ended the program. His 
order stated, “The Court has reviewed the reports on the program and 
determined that it cannot justify continuation of the program. Accord-
ingly, upon issuance of this administrative order, the statewide man-
aged mediation program is terminated.”73  
Unlike Pennsylvania, and formerly Florida, Nevada is an “opt-
in” state.74 Its mediation program went into effect in July 2009, and by 
August of that year, only ten mediations had been scheduled despite 
having more than 7,500 foreclosure filings per month.
75
 The state’s 
foreclosure rate is still among the highest in the nation, but there have 
been substantial improvements in the law and its participation rate. By 
the end of April 2010, after increasing the number of mediators, re-
quests for mediation totaled nearly 8,000.
76
 Figures obtained by the 
Reno-Gazette Journal, one of Nevada’s leading newspapers, show that 
from July 1, 2009 to March 31, 2011, more than 15,000 distressed bor-
rowers requested mediation.
77
 Of that number, more than 10,000 bor-
rowers completed mediations.
78
 Fifty-two percent of completed media-
tions resulted in no foreclosure and thirty-six percent resulted in 
homeowners staying in their homes.
79
  
A number of states lack foreclosure mediation programs alto-
gether. Utah, Idaho,
80
 and Minnesota all currently do not have a fore-
closure program on the books, although there have been legislative ef-
forts to enact mediation programs.
81
 Minnesota Governor Tim 
Pawlenty vetoed a 2009 bill, the Homestead Mediation Lender Act, 
which would have expanded the state’s Farmer Lender mediation pro-
                                                          
73
 In re Managed Mediation Program for Residential Mortgage Foreclosure 
Cases, No. AOSC11-44 (Fla. Dec. 19, 2011). 
74
 COHEN & JAKABOVICS, supra note 59, at 3. 
75
 Id. at 10. 
76
 Id. 
77
 Jason Hidalgo, Nevada’s Foreclosure Mediation Program Cites Confidenti-
ality in Refusal to Release Records, RENO GAZETTE J., July 19, 2011, at Business 
Section. 
78
 Id. 
79
 Id.  
80
 Idaho’s bill does not require mediation, but it does require the lender to pro-
vide the mortgagor with loan modification documents. See H.B. 331, 2011 Leg., 61st 
Sess. (Idaho 2011). 
81
 See supra note 13 for a list of foreclosure mediation programs by state that 
fails to list Utah, Idaho, or Minnesota; but see S.B. 80, 2011 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2011) 
available at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/banking/foreclosures-2011-legisla 
tion.aspx, for Utah’s attempt to pass foreclosure mediation legislation; see also infra 
note 84 and accompanying text, for Minnesota’s attempt. 
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gram.
82
 Governor Pawlenty took issue with a number of the bill’s pro-
visions, including the $125 foreclosure fee, stating the program should 
be able to support itself.
83
 The Housing crisis has hit minority commu-
nities in St. Paul particularly hard. A recent report by a Minneapolis 
faith-based group, Isaiah, found that “[a]lmost half of the city’s vacant 
housing is located in a minority neighborhood, although minority 
neighborhoods contain just 20% of the housing units in the city.”84 
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
A. Mediation has Inherent Structural Flaws that Negatively  
Affect Minority Communities. 
 
Mediation, despite all of its benefits, is not without its short-
comings. One legal commentator noted that the African American 
community’s “historic experiences” of racial discrimination, slavery, 
and Jim Crow laws, which were “sanctioned and protected by law,” 
have led to a distrust of legal and judicial systems.
85
 Moreover, the 
commentator said, African-Americans are “more likely to consult 
‘close family, friends and spiritual leaders’ to discuss ‘core problems’ 
first.”86 It is not inconceivable that the lingering distrust may only be 
amplified when the adverse party in mediation is one that seeks to take 
something away from the other party. This is especially true in the 
context of foreclosures that are the result of predatory lending.  
With distrust as the backdrop, mediation’s inherent flaws are 
exacerbated. Some scholars have noted that mediation allows weaker 
parties to be manipulated by “not-so-neutral” mediators.87 These me-
diators may have objectives that are at odds with those of the parties 
subject to mediation. For instance, some mediators have “the settle all 
                                                          
82
 Betsy Sundquist, Legislative Efforts to Hold Back Foreclosure Tide in Min-
nesota Died in Committee, SAINT PAUL LEGAL LEDGER CAPITOL REPORT, May 28, 
2009; See also H.J. Cummins, Foreclosure Mediation, Relief for the Little Guy, the 
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costs mentality while others may have their own, well-intentioned, but 
misguided idea of what is appropriate, fair or likely to happen at tri-
al.”88 Additionally, the confidential nature of mediation has been criti-
cized as “hiding malfeasance.”89 In fact, the Reno Gazette-Journal re-
cently expressed frustration at the state’s strict mediation 
confidentiality laws: “The program cited confidentiality in denying re-
quests for six other records. Another six were not provided because the 
information was not available.”90 The article further commented, 
“[T]he records that were not provided strike at the heart of measuring 
the programs’ success.”91  
In a widely cited 1985 article published in the Wisconsin Law 
Review, Richard Delgado raised early concerns about ADR and its po-
tential for fostering class-based prejudice and abuse.
92
 There, he said 
that the informal nature of ADR renders it susceptible to an exploita-
tion of groups that are already “particularly vulnerable to prejudice.”93 
Delgado notes that several theories explain racial or ethnic prejudice.
94
 
Among them are social-psychological theories of prejudice.
95
 These 
theories explain racial prejudice as behavior that is learned through 
groups and generally emerges in early childhood.
96
 Delgado argues 
that prejudiced people are least likely to act-out or express their feel-
ings if the feelings in question, “deviate from what is expected.”97 
When that deviation from the norm occurs, prejudiced people will 
change or suppress their behavior.
98
 It is the formal structure of adju-
dication that serves as a check on the behavior of prejudiced individu-
als.
99
 Conversely, “ADR increases the risk of prejudice toward vulner-
able disputants . . . . [T]he rules and structure of formal justice tend to 
suppress bias, whereas informality tends to increase it.”100 Delgado 
notes that prejudice is most likely to take root “when a person of low 
status and power confronts a person or institution of high status and 
                                                          
88
 Id. at 354.  
89
 Id. 
90
 Hidalgo, supra note 77. 
91
 Id. 
92
 Delgado et al., supra note 34, at 1361. 
93
 Id. 
94
 Id. at 1375. 
95
 Id. at 1380. 
96
 Id. 
97
 Id. at 1387. 
98
 Delgado et al., supra note 34, at 1387. 
99
 Id. at 1388. 
100
 Id. at 1400. 
Jones 2/13/2013  3:59 PM 
408 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL 12:2 
power.”101 The “minority” party is also “less likely to press his or her 
claim energetically” and this effect is compounded when the mediator 
is a member of the superior group.
102
 Proponents of ADR argue that its 
informality is its virtue because parties that might be threatened by 
formal court procedures might be more willing to participate in an in-
formal forum.
103
 
 
B.  Formal Court Litigation is a Better Vehicle to Vindicate the Rights 
of Minority Communities that Have Fallen Victim to  
Predatory Lending. 
 
Many low-income neighborhoods are breeding grounds for 
risky, high interest lending.
104
 Low-income communities are often the 
targets of “gotcha” gimmicks, and often, these tactics go undetected 
until they grow so egregious and out-of-control that nothing short of 
judicial intervention will resolve the problem. The practice of predato-
ry lending shares a similar narrative. The United States Department of 
Housing and Urban Development describes predatory lending as prac-
tices engaged by appraisers, mortgage brokers, and home improvement 
contractors who among other things, “encourage borrowers to lie about 
their incomes . . . in order to get a loan,” “knowingly lend more money 
than a borrower can afford to pay,” and “charge more high interest 
rates to borrowers based on their race or national origin and not on 
their credit history.”105  
Studies have shown that risky, subprime loans are indeed more 
prevalent in minority communities.
106
 In the midst of the foreclosure 
crisis, the New York Times ran an article regarding a recently published 
study that indicated home buyers in predominately minority neighbor-
hoods in New York were more likely to receive a subprime loan.
107
 
New York University’s Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Pol-
icy conducted the analysis and found that in Jamaica Queens, forty-six 
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percent of mortgages were issued by subprime lenders, whereas none 
of the predominately white neighborhoods had a rate more than the 
city’s average of 19.8%.108 A similar study in 2006 by the Center for 
Responsible Lending showed that African-American borrowers with 
prepayment penalties were six to thirty-four percent more likely to re-
ceive a higher-rate loan than white borrowers.
109
 Latino borrowers 
were twenty-nine percent to 142% more likely to receive a higher-rate 
loan than their white counterparts.
110
 
Litigation has been one vehicle for parties to hold predatory 
lenders accountable. Beginning in 2007, the NAACP alone sued sev-
eral different financial institutions alleging that the institutions violated 
the Fair Housing and Equal Credit Opportunity Acts for their lending 
practices.
111
 In general, lawsuits do not require the high degree of con-
fidentiality that mediation does, so plaintiffs are in a better position to 
hold the feet of the financial institutions to the fire. Legal commenta-
tors have also recognized that the legal system has a framework of 
checks and rules to insure that biases and prejudice don’t affect the 
rights of parties.
112
 Delgado’s “Fairness and Formality: Minimizing 
the Risk in Alternative Dispute Resolution,” went into great depth re-
garding court mechanisms in place that “check and contain preju-
dice.”113 First, he noted, judges serve long terms and often have repeti-
tive caseloads, diminishing the likelihood that the judge will rule based 
solely on the parties to the litigation.
114
 Second, lawyers can also 
check the biases of jurors through voir dire and peremptory challenges, 
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although the latter has been subject to abuse.
115
 Third, rules of civil 
procedure and evidence govern formal adjudications and can also 
check prejudice by sanctioning parties for misconduct and facilitating 
the introduction of relevant evidence.
116
  
The available remedies in litigation as compared to mediation 
also give force to litigation’s superiority as a vehicle to vindicate 
rights. During mediation, the best-case scenario for many homeowners 
is to stay in their homes with payments that they can afford through a 
loan modification. In litigation, the injured party might receive a mon-
etary award, and the party at fault might be deterred from future con-
duct from the sheer negative publicity of trial. Indeed, many of the 
banks that contributed to the housing crisis have been the targets of 
negative press.
117
  
In President Obama’s January 2012 State of the Union Ad-
dress, he announced the formation of a new Department of Justice unit 
that would investigate and potentially prosecute the banks that caused 
the collapse of the housing market.
118
 In 2009, Baltimore City sued 
Wells Fargo bank for the bank’s unfair lending practices.119 The city’s 
suit marked the first time a municipality sued a financial institution for 
its discriminatory lending practices since the foreclosure crisis began 
in 2007.
120
 The city suffered a number of legal setbacks when its com-
plaint was dismissed several times by a federal district court judge.
121
 
Finally, in July 2012, Wells Fargo settled the case with the City by 
agreeing to pay $175 million, the second-largest fair-lending settle-
ment in the history of the Justice Department.
122
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C.  Maryland Should Re-Evaluate its Foreclosure Mediation  
Law to Better Serve the Needs of the State’s  
Most Vulnerable Homeowners. 
 
On September 22, 2011, Governor O’Malley established the 
Maryland Foreclosure Task Force.
123
 The task force was charged with 
accomplishing three goals.
124
 The first was to identify key foreclosure 
trends and the impact of foreclosures in the state.
125
 The second was to 
identify strategies to “enhance loss mitigation outcomes for homeown-
ers.”126 The task force’s final charge was to identify effective strate-
gies to strengthen neighborhoods in the state that have been affected 
by foreclosure.
127
 The task force released a report detailing its recom-
mendations on January 11, 2012.
128
 Because the task force’s mandate 
was broad, its recommendations were similarly scaled. However, the 
report’s proposals to enhance loss mitigation are particularly instruc-
tive here.  
Among the chief obstacles to loss mitigation cited in the report 
were timing and income.
129
 It is important for homeowners to seek 
housing counseling early, as there are often tight deadlines and narrow 
windows to receive assistance.
130
 Many homeowners facing foreclo-
sure have fallen on hard times and may be unemployed, making it 
more difficult for the homeowner facing foreclosure to satisfy his or 
her arrears.
131
 In the midst of the task force’s research, Maryland’s Of-
fice of the Commissioner of Financial Regulation instituted emergency 
foreclosure regulations aimed at fixing some of the aforementioned 
problems. The emergency changes revised the structure and language 
of foreclosure documents, making them much easier for the average 
homeowner to comprehend.
132The task force’s recommendations to 
enhance loss mitigation included a pre-file mediation proposal that 
would introduce mediation as an option to both the homeowner and 
the mortgage service prior to the filing of a foreclosure action in Cir-
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cuit Court.
133
 The report also recommended extended forbearance for 
homeowners who have lost their jobs.
134
Additionally, the task force 
suggested that homeowners facing foreclosure have a “single point of 
contact” with the lender to prevent the frustration that homeowners of-
ten face when they are passed around from one representative to the 
next and information is misplaced.
135
 The recommendations listed in 
the report represent leaps toward the finish line of slowing foreclosures 
in the state; however, Maryland should strongly consider moving from 
an opt-in mediation system to an automatic mediation program. 
 
1.  The opt-in requirement fails to capture the most  
needy at-risk homeowners. 
 
Although Maryland’s foreclosure mediation program is a step 
in the right direction, the “opt-in” requirement fails to capture a signif-
icant number of low-income homeowners who are least likely to take 
advantage of the mediation process. Even when this cohort requests 
mediation, confusing paperwork, legalese, and tight deadlines often 
besiege them, limiting the likelihood of a successful settlement. Mary-
land should amend the law to replace the “opt-in” provision with an 
“opt-out” provision or the state should institute automatic mediation 
where the first mediation session is scheduled automatically once the 
lender institutes a foreclosure action. This change will automatically 
swallow-up all homeowners faced with foreclosure and reach a far 
greater population than the current provision.  
Nearly one year ago, the Boston Globe ran an editorial touting 
the benefits of automatic mediation as support for the mayor’s effort to 
make the city’s process automatic.136 The Globe rightfully pointed out 
that automatic mediation helps build “transparency and communica-
tion into the foreclosure process.”137 The Center for American Pro-
gress (“CAP”) is also a proponent of automatic mediation.138 CAP 
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goes further and recommends that the federal government also institute 
automatic mediation through its mortgage entities.
139
  
 
2. Strengthen external laws – whistleblower protection as a tool in the 
foreclosure mitigation tool belt 
 
At first blush, it is hard to imagine how whistleblower protec-
tion laws might relate to a strengthening of loss mitigation strategies, 
but the seemingly irreparable state of this country’s housing market 
has left little room for conventional parallels. One group, Progressive 
States Action (“PSA”), describes its mission as one that “aims to trans-
form the political landscape by sparking progressive actions at the 
state level.”140 PSA included as part of its foreclosure and predatory 
lending reform platform, a recommendation to legislatures to enact 
laws that would “protect employees of financial institutions from retal-
iation when they reveal criminal or unethical conduct by their employ-
ers . . . .”141 This relatively straightforward idea has serious potential in 
Maryland, where a recent Court of Appeals case has ripened the field 
for this idea to take root.  
In Lawson v. Bowie State University,
142
 the Maryland Court of 
Appeals reinstated an employee after concluding that he was wrong-
fully terminated.
143
 Lawson, a nearly twenty-year veteran of the Bowie 
State University Police Department superseded his department’s chain 
of command when he reported his fellow officers’ misconduct to the 
University’s Vice President of Student Affairs.144 The Vice-President 
notified Lawson’s Department Chief who then fired Lawson for in-
subordination.
145
 Lawson challenged his firing before an administra-
tive law judge and argued that he was entitled to whistleblower protec-
tion because the letter he wrote, which revealed his colleagues’ 
behavior, constituted a “protected disclosure.”146 The judge ruled that 
the letter could not be considered a “protected disclosure” because it 
was part and parcel of Lawson’s personal mission to improve his de-
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partment rather than the purpose of notifying a higher-up of a viola-
tion.
147
 The Court of Appeals concluded that the administrative judge 
applied the wrong standard by zeroing in on Lawson’s motivations for 
disclosure.
148
 The Court stated, “. . . [B]oth the WPA and Maryland’s 
Whistleblower Protection statute require only that an employee have a 
reasonable belief that he is reporting a violation, not that the employee 
possess a purely altruistic motive for the disclosure.”149 The Court’s 
ruling and the reasoning supporting it have broad application to loss 
mitigation strategies.
150
  
If a bank were state owned or otherwise state operated,
151
 the 
Court’s interpretation of Maryland’s whistleblower protection law 
would serve to counteract predatory or risky lending practices that 
were prevalent during the subprime boom.
152
 In theory, using the 
Court’s interpretation of the federal Whistleblower Protect Act and 
Maryland’s Whistleblower Protection statute, an employee of a state 
financial institution would have recourse to challenge his or her firing 
if the firing was believed to have been triggered by the reporting or ob-
jecting to unfair, abusive or deceptive practices. This internal check 
coupled with oversight of financial institutions might serve as a power-
ful tool to prevent unsuspecting homeowners from being entangled in 
risky loans.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Home foreclosures existed before the housing crisis, and, by all 
accounts, they will persist. How often they will occur and where they 
will be concentrated, one can only predict. However, many states and 
municipalities seem more prepared today to deal with the uncertainty 
of the economic future than before the housing bubble burst. Media-
tion has become a critical tool for states as they try to soften the blow 
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of the housing crisis. While mediation has proven successful in cities 
like Philadelphia and has strong prospects for further success in Mary-
land, it is important to be cautious of the ways in which mediation 
might prove to be less than ideal. Inequities in bargaining power and 
the informality of ADR are both downsides of mediation that might 
hurt more than they help minority communities. Litigation can be cost-
ly and lengthy, but it has the potential to better vindicate the rights of 
homeowners who have been targeted through unfair lending practices. 
If foreclosure mediation is here to stay, the state can strengthen loss 
mitigation by switching the current mediation program from opt-in to 
automatic mediation. Additionally, Maryland legislators and housing 
advocates should consider the broad application of whistleblower pro-
tection laws to protect employees of financial institutions who wish to 
expose unfair lending practices.  
 
